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Abstract
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are an emerging research area
that provide low-cost and high-speed network services for the end
users. Key establishment, on the other hand, is the most important
and critical security concern for WMNs as all the other types of wireless
networks. However, the conventional solutions for key establishment
do not fit in the unique constraints and requirements of WMNs.
In this thesis, we propose two efficient and secure key establish-
ment protocols elaborated at the sake of WMNs. Our security model
is based on Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) and Threshold Secret
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Sharing (ThSS). By the utilization of IBC, we eliminate the necessity
of certificates used in infrastructure based schemes along with meeting
the security requirements. With the utilization of ThSS, we provide
a more resilient network working in a self-organizing way to provide
the key establishment service, without the assumption of a trusted au-
thority.
In the schemes we propose, master private key of the network is
distributed among the mesh nodes. The user private key generation
service is handled with collaboration of k mesh nodes, where k is the
threshold value. A high threshold value increases the resiliency of the
network against attacks; however, this negatively affects the system
performance. We performed simulative performance evaluation in or-
der to show the effect of both the number of mesh nodes in the network
and the threshold value k on the performance. For the threshold values
smaller than 8, at least 90% of the mesh nodes compute their private
keys within at most 70 seconds. When we increase the number of mesh
nodes in the network from 40 to 100, the rate of successful private key
generations increase from 75% to 100% at the threshold value 8 where
the latency of the key establishment is around 80 seconds. Considering
the same increase in the number of mesh nodes, network performs up
to 42% better at worst case, for the threshold values larger than 8, and
the latency becomes at most 90 seconds on the average.
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TELSİZ IZGARA AĞLAR İÇİN KİMLİK TABANLI
KRİPTOGRAFİ VE EŞİK SIR PAYLAŞIMI KULLANAN BİR
ANAHTAR TESİS MEKANİZMASI
Duygu KARAOĞLAN
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2009
Tez Danışmanları: Doç. Dr. Albert Levi, Doç. Dr. Erkay Savaş
Anahtar Kelimeler: Telsiz Izgara Ağlar, Anahtar Tesis Etme Mekanizması,
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Özet
Telsiz Izgara Ağlar gelişmekte olan bir araştırma alanıdır ve kullanıcılara
hem ucuz hem de hızlı servis sağlamaktadırlar. Öte yandan, anahtar tesis
etme mekanizması, her türlü ağda olduğu gibi Telsiz Izgara Ağlar için de
çok önemli ve kritik bir güvenlik kaygısıdır. Ancak, anahtar tesis etmek için
kullanılan geleneksel yöntemler Telsiz Izgara Ağlar’ın benzersiz özelliklerine
ve kısıtlamalarına uymamaktadır.
Bu tez ile, Telsiz Izgara Ağlar’a özel tasarlanmış iki verimli ve güvenli
anahtar tesis etme mekanizması sunuyoruz. Güvenlik modelimiz Kimlik Ta-
banlı Kriptografi ve Eşik Sır Paylaşımına dayalı. Kimlik Tabanlı Kriptografi
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kullanımı güvenlik gerekliliklerini sağlamakla birlikte geleneksel sistemlerin
gerektirdiği sertifikaları da ortadan kaldırmaktadır. Diğer yandan, Eşik Sır
Paylaşımı ağın daha esnek olmasına olanak vermekle birlikte kendi kendine
düzenlenen bir anahtar tesis etme mekanizmasının oluşturulabilmesini sağla-
maktadır.
Sunduğumuz iki mekanizmada da ağın ana şifresi kullanıcılar tarafın-
dan paylaşılmaktadır ve kullanıcıların şifrelerinin hesaplanması ancak yeterli
sayıda kullanıcının - eşik değerini sağlayacak şekilde - biraraya gelmesi ile
gerçekleşmektedir. Eşik değerini arttırdığımızda ağın saldırılara karşı olan
esnekliği de artar ama bu durum sistemin performansını kötüleştirmektedir.
Toplam kullanıcı sayısının ve eşik değerinin performans üzerindeki etkilerini
görebilmek için bir takım similasyonlar yaptık: 8’den küçük eşik değerleri
için kullanıcıların en az %90’ı kendi şifrelerini en fazla 70 saniyede oluştura-
bilmektedir. Eşik değerini 8’e sabitleyerek, kullanıcı sayısını 40’dan 100’e
yükseltirsek, kullanıcı şifrelerinin oluşturulabilme yüzdesi de %75’den %100’e
yükselmektedir ve işlemler 80 saniyede tamamlanmaktadır. Eşik değerini 8’in
üstüne çıkardığımızda ise, kullanıcı sayısındaki aynı artış en kötü durumda
bile ağın %42 daha verimli olduğunu göstermektedir ve işlemler bu koşullarda
en fazla 90 saniyede son bulmaktadır.
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1 Introduction
Wireless Mesh Metworks (WMNs) are wireless networks in which nodes are
able to carry out mesh routing by the utilization of multi hop communication.
They are dynamically self-organized, self-healed and self-configured; meaning
that the mesh nodes form a network on the fly. Furthermore, they offer
both low-cost and high-speed network services for the end users. Along
with the ease of their deployment, they provide mobility, flexibility, high
robustness and increased coverage with an effective level of scalability. To
have those advantages, the utilization of WMNs became a convincing choice
and is preferred in the areas that do not have wired infrastructure or in the
territories on which a temporary wireless network will be deployed.
Nevermore, multi hop cummunication and the nature of wireless channel
make the WMNs prone to both passive and active attacks. Thus, the commu-
nication security between the mesh nodes is the most important problem to
take a strong interest in. In order to maintain mutual trust and secure com-
munication among the mesh nodes, a key establishment service must be pro-
vided. The limitations of conventional solutions necessitate the development
of a brand-new security architecture to cope with the unique requirements
of WMNs [1].
In this thesis, we propose two efficient and secure key establishment pro-
tocols which are designed with respect to the requirements and constraints
of WMNs. The utilization of Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) along with
Threshold Secret Sharing (ThSS) is preferred to overcome the problems at
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present, namely network bandwidth consumption, network resiliency and sin-
gle point of failure. In addition to those, we also achieved all of the security
requirements of WMNs with the use of IBC.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 contains back-
ground information on WMNs, key establishment and the cryptographic al-
gorithms that form the basis of a secure key establishment scheme together
with the related work. In Section 3, motivation and contributions of the
thesis are presented. Then we describe our proposed solutions in detail in
Section 4. In Section 5, to what extend the security requirements are met
and in Section 6 the computational and communicational complexities are
examined. Section 7 consists of the evaluation of our proposed solutions.
Finally, we conclude the thesis in Section 8.
2
2 Background Information and Related Work
In this section, we explicate the characterictics of Wireless Mesh Networks
(WMNs) along with their security requirements. Then, we define the cryp-
tographic protocols we utilized and we give an introductory information on
key establishment. Finally, we conclude the section with the related work
done in the field of WMN security.
2.1 Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs)
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are enclosed with mesh routers and mesh
clients, where mesh routers are stationary while mesh clients can either be
stationary or mobile. The backbone of a WMN consists of mesh routers and
the whole WMN is formed by the appendage of mesh clients. Along with
integrating stationary and mobile nodes, a WMN can optionally provide
Internet access [11].
A typical WMN, having an infrastucture as in Figure 1 is shown in Figure
2.
3
Figure 1: Infrastructure of a WMN
Figure 2: A Wireless Mesh Network (WMN)
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2.1.1 Characteristics of WMNs
Multi hop wireless network Power of the signal is maintained by splitting
the long distances into shorter hops. Each mesh node acts as a repeater that
forwards data on behalf of the source node until the data reaches the destina-
tion. Thus, WMNs achieve a network with higher bandwidth in comparison
to other wireless networks of whose coverage areas are the same [1].
Infrastructure and mobility The infrastructure can be defined as a wireless
cooperative communication carried out in between a number of mesh nodes
[24]. At any time, any node can either join or leave the network and that does
not affect any network functionality. On the contrary, joining nodes enlarge
the network coverage and provide a larger connectivity since they also act as
forwarders. Besides, if a mesh node crushes or decides to leave the network, a
neighbor of it can be in the routing path instead of itself. This characteristic
increases the availability of the network. Additionally, with the fact that the
mesh routers are stationary, continuous connectivity throughout the network
is achieved without compromising the performance.
Dedicated configuration WMNs consist of mesh routers and mesh clients,
as mentioned above. The difference between these two types of mesh nodes
underlies not only in their mobility but also in the energy consumption con-
straints they have. Mesh clients are assumed to have a larger amount of
energy consumption limitation. Therefore, the load of functionalities that
require a higher computational power and bandwidth can burden on the
5
mesh routers.
Integration WMNs enable integration of various existing networks through
the gateway functionalities of the mesh routers [1]. This provides that an
end user within a network can utilize a service of another network through
a WMN.
All the abovementioned characteristic brings out a different advantageous
aspect of WMNs. However, WMNs also have disadvantages, as one should
expect. Although the utilization of multi hop communication yields advan-
tegous characteristics, it is also one of the derogations of WMNs. Due to
the nature of wireless channel, all wireless networks are prone to passive
attacks. However, the communication carried out in a multi hop fashion re-
sults in the possibility of active attacks [28]. In a WMN, a passive attack will
result in the violation of confidentiality whereas an active attack will compro-
mise resiliency, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation [25]. Therefore,
maintaining the communication security between the mesh nodes is the most
important problem to take a strong interest in. In addition to those, mesh
nodes have both limited power and limited storage area, because of which
thet cannot perform large computations.
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2.1.2 Security Requirements
Authentication ensures that the communicating entity has the identity
that it claims to have; meaning that the origin is correctly identified. In a
group of wireless nodes, this is achieved by either using pairwise keys, using a
group key or with the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based schemes.
Unless authenticity is accomplished, an adversary can masquerade a node
and gain unauthorized network access.
Confidentiality ensures that only the ones who are authorized to have
access to specific data can access that data. In other words, confidential-
ity hides the contents of the information exchanged, thus protects the data
from unauthorized disclosure. This is achieved by encrypting the data and
giving access to the authorized party for decryption. Obviously, first the
authentication must be achieved.
Integrity is the assurance of the fact that only the authorized parties can
modify the data. By this, the validity of the data exchanged is satisfied. As a
resuly, when integrity is achieved, any party can understand whether the in-
formation sent is modified, replayed, deleted or not. This is generally ensured
by the use of a number referred as a Message Integrity/Authentication Code,
which is computed with both the data and a shared secret and is appended
to the end of the data. When the receiving party gets the information, it
computes the extension part using the secret and checks whether it is equal
to or not to the received extension part. Alternatively, it is also achieved
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by using session keys, which are the symmetric keys that the communicating
parties hold. The exchanged data in a session between the communicating
parties is encrypted and decrypted with this session key.
Non-repudiation requires that neither of the authorized parties deny the
information being exchanged. In other words, it is the protection against
denial by either of the communicating parties. This security requirement is
actually useful in the detection of compromised nodes; it allows a user receiv-
ing an errornous message to decide whether the sending node is compromised
or not. Non-repudiation is ensured by using a signature scheme in which the
data to be sent is encrypted with the sender’s private key.
2.2 Key Establishment
In order to establish and maintain mutual trust and secure communication
among the mesh nodes, a key establishment service must be provided. This
leads to the significance of how the keys are managed to be exchanged or dis-
tributed. There are basically two approaches: symmetric key establishment
and asymmetric key establishment.
In the decision of the key establishment protocol that will be utilized,
characteristics and constraints of a network plays an important role. Be-
cause of the fact that symmetric key algorithms have a lower computational
complexity than that of asymmetric ones, the commonly preferred way of
ensuring a secure communication passes over using an asymmetric key es-
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tablishment protocol to agree on a symmetric session key.
2.2.1 Symmetric Key Establishment
Symmetric key establishment involves the distribution of the symmetric keys,
which are used in both encryption and decryption within a communication
session. This type of key establishment is provided in two different ways. In
the first way, a trusted authority, which generates and distributes the keys, is
assumed. This is impractical due to the hardness of keeping a server available
everytime it is needed to be used. In the second way, the burden of the key
generation is given to one of the communicating parties. In other words, one
of the parties generates the secret key to be used and sends it securely to
the other party. However, in both types of the symmetric key establishment,
there is the risk of being prone to single point of failure.
2.2.2 Asymmetric Key Establishment
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) is first proposed by Diffie and Hellman in
1976 [7] and is considered to the be the most important breakthrough in the
history of cryptography [26].
In PKC, each user has a pair of public and private keys. The private key
of the user is kept secret while the public key is widely distributed. Basically
the public and the private keys are related to each other; however it is not
mathematically feasible to derive the private key from the public key. And
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most importantly, the key that is used to encyrpt a message is different from
the key by which the corresponding message is decrypted.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the most important characteristic of
the traditional PKC. It ensures an infrastructure that keeps track of the
public keys with both the use of certification, by which the public keys are
bind to the users, and validation, by which the certificates are guaranteed
to be applicable. Certificates consist of the user information along with the
public keys of that user most commonly signed by a certification authority
(CA). Since the CAs are trusted authorities and either known or reachable
by every user; its public key is used by the users in the validation process.
Beside the PKI-based schemes, Identity-based Cryptography (IBC), which
is explained in Section 2.3.1, is another type of PKC which is utilized in the
asymmetric key establishment. Essentially, IBC seems to be a more effi-
cient approach for WMNs since it eliminates the certificate based public key
distribution indispensible in the conventional PKI-based schemes.
2.3 Cryptographic Overview
Any adversary can monitor a mesh node easily due to the utilization of
wireless channel along with multi hop communication and mobility [31]. This
brings out the fact that WMNs are prone to both passive and active attacks.
In a WMN, a passive attack will result in violation of confidentiality whereas
an active attack may compromise availability, integrity, authentication and
non-repudiation [28]. Therefore, the difficulty of providing communication
10
security between the mesh nodes is one of the main drawbacks of WMNs.
The other important drawback is the constraints of WMNs, discussed
in Section 2.1.1. For authentication and encryption, traditional Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) based schemes are hard to deploy for WMNs, since the
capabilities of mesh nodes are limited in the sense of resource and power.
Thus, the need for the utilization of symmetric key cryptography arises.
However, to use that approach, there is the need for a good mechanism to
distribute the keys.
In the following subsections, we introduce cryptographic methods that
can be used for the maintanence of such schemes.
2.3.1 Identity-based Cryptography (IBC)
The concept of Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) is put forward by Adi
Shamir [23] in 1985. The basic idea of IBC is to find an approach by which the
public key of a user is defined as an arbitrary string that uniquely identifies
him in such a way that the denial is impossible. It may be the IP address,
e-mail address, name, etc., which eliminates the need for certificates along
with the need for Certificate Authorities (CAs). As a consequence, users in
IBC do not have to exchange public keys, certificates, etc [23]. In IBC, users
may also choose random looking public keys to achieve anonymity.
In IBC, all the user private keys are generated by a trusted authority,
namely the Private Key Generator (PKG). PKG holds a master key (pub-
lic/private key pair), with which the user private key generation is performed.
11
To be clear, without the knowledge of the master private key, none of the
user’s private keys can be generated. After having its user private key, a node
can encrypt/sign and decrypt/verify a message. After delivering the private
key, the PKG does not involve in any other operation. Thus, the network
does not need to be a centralized one and the solution is applicable for closed
groups of users [23].
IBC consists of four phases:
1. Setup Phase (Algorithm 7 in Appendix): Global parameters and the
master key of the system are generated by the PKG. The global pa-
rameters consist of q, G1,G2,H1,H2,eˆ and P . First of all, G1 and G2
are two groups of order q, which is a sufficiently large prime. Secondly,
H1 and H2 are cryptographic hash functions that map arbitrary strings
to non-zero elements in G1 and in the finite field Fq respectively. H1
is used to map the identity of the user to a point on the curve, whilst
H2 is used to map the session key. Finally, eˆ is the bilinear map such
that eˆ : G1G1 −→ G2 and P is the generator of G1. Along with those,
master key has two pairs: master private key, spriv, and master public
key, spub, which is defined as in Equation 2.1.
spub = spriv × P (2.1)
2. Extract Phase (Algorithm 8 in Appendix): PKG uses the master key
along with the public key of the requesting user to construct the user’s
private key. Assuming that the user’s public key is IDi, the private
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key is computed as in Equation 2.2.
PKi = sprivQIDi (2.2)
where, QIDi is defined as in Equation 2.3.
QIDi = H1(IDi) (2.3)
3. Encryption Phase: In the encryption phase, the message to be trans-
mitted is encrypted with the sending user’s private key. This operation
is carried out on the side of the party who will send a message.
4. Decryption Phase: In the decryption phase, the received message is
decrypted with the sending node’s public key, which is computed from
the identity of the sender as in Equation 2.3. As expected, the user
that receives a message performs this operation.
The framework of an IBC is as seen in Figure 3. For instance, let Alice
be the sender and Bob be the receiver. When Alice wants to send a mes-
sage to Bob, she simply encrypts the message with Bob’s public key, i.e.
bob@su.sabanciuniv.edu. On the other hand, when Bob receives the mes-
sage that Alice sent to him, he decrypts it with his user private key. At this
point of time, if he does not yet has his user private key, he contacts with
PKG and sends a request after authenticating himself.
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Figure 3: IBC Framework
The important point here is that the receiving party does not need to
have its user private key to be able to receive a message. That is actually
due to the fact that the sending party does not need for receiving party’s
certificate.
Quite a few schemes proposed in the field of IBC, which can be examined
in detail from [5, 12, 14, 3]. [5] is based on quadratic residues while the others
use pairing operation defined over Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)1. The
1ECC is based on the the difficulty of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and has
almost the same cryptographic security as 1024-bit key length used in RSA [27, 26].
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most practical one is the one proposed by Boneh and Franklin [3], which
uses Weil Pairing as the bilinear mapping on ECC, due to the fact that
it has a performance comparable with ElGamal encryption and it has the
chosen cipher text security in the random oracle model.
2.3.2 Secret Sharing
Secret Sharing is a method that allows a secret to be distributed among
a group of users, in such a way that no single user can deduce the secret
from his2 share alone. The secret cannot be reconstructed unless a certain
condition is met, and that condition is generally a coalition among a sufficient
number of shareholders.
All the secret sharing schemes are based on a field structure and have the
characteristic that a secret s is shared among n participants. What differs
them is the required number of collaborators needed for the reconstruction
process. Henceforth in our constructions, we use Fq field, where q is prime
for simplicity.
Additive Secret Sharing
In Additive Secret Sharing (AdSS) schemes, the secret s is distributed
among n users in a way that adding up all the shares gives the secret. In other
words, it is impossible to reconstruct the secret unless all the shareholders
collude.
2No gender implication.
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AdSS assumes the existence of a trusted third party (TTP), by whom the
shares are generated and transmitted securely3 to the corresponding share-
holders. What TPP performs is as follows:
1. chooses a large prime q and a secret s ∈ Fq.
2. chooses n− 1 random numbers s1, s2, s3, . . ., sn−1 to be the shares of
the secret.
3. computes the last share of the secret by Equation 2.4.
sn = s−
n−1∑
k=1
sk (mod q) (2.4)
4. sends the shares si to the corresponding shareholders, ui.
The reconstruction of the secret in AdSS is performed with the collaboration
of all the shareholders evaluating Equation 2.5.
s =
n∑
i=1
si (mod q) (2.5)
Threshold Secret Sharing
In Threshold Secret Sharing (ThSS) schemes, the secret s is distributed
among n users in such a way that any subset of k users can reconstruct the
secret s, but no subset of smaller size can. These schemes are also known as
(n, k)-ThSS schemes.
3The trusted authority is assumed to be powerful enough to establish a secure commu-
nication link
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Shamir’s ThSS
One of the widely used ThSS schemes is proposed by Adi Shamir [22] in
1979. The basis of his scheme is linear polynomial interpolation, in which
given a set of k data points in the 2-dimensional plane(xi, yi), there is one
and only one polynomial f(x) of degree k − 1 such that f(x) = yi for all i
for distinct values of xi’s [22].
The Lagrange Interpolation Polynomial is a linear interpolation polyno-
mial in which the data points are in the Lagrange form. Given a set of k data
points in the 2-dimensional plane (xi, yi), the Lagrange polynomial is defined
as the linear combination given in Equation 2.6 of the Lagrange coefficients
defined by Equation 2.7.
L(x) =
k∑
j=1
yjlj(x) (2.6)
lj(x) =
k∏
i=1, i 6=j
x− xi
xi − xj (2.7)
The existence of TTP is also assumed in Shamir’s ThSS scheme, whose
role is to generate and to distribute the shares. TTP performs these opera-
tions as in Algorithm 11 given in Apendix and the operations are as follows:
1. chooses a large prime q, a secret s ∈ Fq and a polynomial f(z) of degree
k − 1, such that f(0) = s.
2. evaluates the polynomial for each user to generate their shares via
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Equation 2.8.
si = f(i) (mod q) (2.8)
3. sends the shares si to the corresponding shareholders, ui.
As for the reconstruction of the secret, k of the shareholders combine their
shares as it is given in Algorithm 12 in Appendix, performing Equation 2.9.
f(a) =
k∑
j=1
sjlj(a) (mod q) (2.9)
lj(a) =
k∏
i=1, i 6=j
a− i
i− j (mod q) (2.10)
Shamir’s ThSS Without a TTP
The problem of Shamir’s ThSS stems from the assumption of the TTP,
which can be eliminated by the idea of the nodes being collaboratively com-
puting the secret s. Each node contributing to the generation of the secret
has an equal influence on its value.
For the collaborative key generation, each node Ni performs the following
operations:
1. selects a secret xi and a polynomial fi(z) of degree k − 1, such that
fi(0) = xi.4
2. generates the shares xi, j5 of xi, where j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n, as described
4Modulus is assumed to be known by all the nodes.
5The subscript i, j is defined as by i for j.
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in Section 2.3.2.
3. sends xi, j to Nj, where j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n and j 6= i.
When node Ni receives n− 1 of xj, i’s, where j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n and j 6= i, it
can compute its shared secret (Algorithm 1) via Equation 2.11.
si =
k∑
j=1
xj, i (mod q) (2.11)
Algorithm 1 COMPUTE-SHARE-OF-THE-SECRET (xi, j)
(1) sharedData ← xj, j
(2) i ← 0
(3) while i < n do
(4) if i 6= j then
(5) sharedData ← (sharedData+ xi, j) mod q
(6) end if
(7) i ← i+ 1
(8) end while
(9) return sharedData
Figure 4 below, shows an instance of a share construction performed by
three users. Alice, Bob and Charlie first selects a secret and then evaluates
it on the polynomial he/she has selected. The resulting three shares of the
chosen secret correspond to the subshares of the actual secret to be shared.
As either of them receives two subshares, he/she can compute his/her share
of the actual secret.
This computed share befits to the share distributed by the TTP in an (n,
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k)-ThSS. Therefore, with the collaboration of k shareholders, the secret can
be reconstructed as it is done in the (n, k)-ThSS scheme.
Figure 4: An Example for Shared Secret Construction
Variations on ThSS
The abovementioned ThSS schemes consider splitting the secret s, in be-
tween n users by giving each of them one share. However, we might have
different levels of trust for different users or we might want to make some of
the users more important than the others.
In such a situation, one way of handling this is to give a larger number
of shares to the users we trust more: if we give x shares to the trusted users,
we give y shares to the others, with x > y. Thus, the scheme becomes an
(ax+ by, k)-ThSS in which a is the number of users that we trust more and
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b is the number of regular users.
Another approach is to share the secret additively among two groups
whereby the additive shares are shared again with a ThSS scheme. To be
more precise, let us assume that we have n = n1 + n2 users for the share to
be distributed among. Let the secret be s = s1 + s2 with s1 being shared
in a (n1, k1)-ThSS fashion among the first group and s2 being shared in a
(n2, k2)-ThSS fashion among the second group. Then, k1 users from the first
group and k2 users from the second group need to collaborate in order to
reconstruct the secret s.
2.4 Related Work
Salem and Hubaux [2] describe specifics of WMNs and identify three fun-
demental network security requirements: detection of compromised mesh
routers, utilization of secure routing and fairness. In [28] Wu and Li propose
Onion Routing, a private routing algorithm, which utilizes layered encryption
in the achievement of end user privacy. Using this scheme, a group of users
can connect to the Internet through the Onion routers without revealing the
routing information. In [16], Siddique et al. proposes a secure multi hop
routing protocol for WMNs. Their network model consists of several mesh
networks and they propose a routing algorithm with four components of
which the main characteristic is that they utilize both proactive and reactive
routing protocols.
Besides the routing related solutions mentioned above, secure authen-
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tication protocols are also proposed for WMNs. For example, in [29, 30],
Zhang and Fang propose UPASS/ARSA, a secure authentication and billing
architecture to enable an omnipresent network with faultness roaming. In
UPASS, the network is divided into domains each having a key of its own
and a number of trusted authorities, as CAs, are assumed. When a mesh
client wants access to the network, it first connects to the trusted authority
to get its private key and then connects to the mesh router of the domain in
which it stands. Thus, trust model of UPASS is built upon both PKI and
IBC, which is not practical due to the fact that the users need to perform
both CBC and IBC operations. Additinally, the scheme does not provide
an efficient mechanism for key revocation. On the contrary, ISA proposed
by Li [13] defines a good key revocation method. The necessity of the key
revocation is determined by a neighbor detection mechanism in which if a
certain number of nodes accuses a specific node, that node is treated as com-
promised. Moreover, ISA provides an efficient network access based on IBC
with the assumption of the gateway router being the trusted authority. All
the operations, i.e. key generation, key revocation and key renewal, are per-
formed on the gateway router. When a new mesh client wants access to the
network, it first connects to the gateway router to get its private key and then
it implements a 3-way handshake protocol with the mesh router to compute
a shared key. In spite of providing a leightweight network access and a good
mechanism for the marking of compromised nodes, the assumption of a trust
authority diminishes its practicability.
All the abovementioned protocols assume a trusted authority for efficient
and secure key management. However, in practice, it is not very feasible
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to make such an assumption because of the hardness of maintaining such
a server safely and keeping it available all the time. In order to eliminate
the assumption of a trusted authority, threshold secret sharing is used in
[31] and [9]. Zhou and Hass [31] presents a key management protocol based
on the traditional PKI scheme, in which a group of nodes share the role
of the CA. The nodes that withhold a share of the certificate signing key
are able to generate partially signed certificates. As in the (n, k)-threshold
scheme, any k partially signed certificates can collaboratively construct a
signed certificate which befits to a certificate that is signed by a CA of the
traditional PKI-based schemes. A similar approach is proposed by Kong [9],
in which the RSA certificate signing key is distributed among all the nodes
of the network. The two schemes differ only in the name of the number of
shareholders. When they are compared, the one proposed by Kong seems to
have an advantage of providing a better availability since it is easier to get
in contact with k neighbors in that scheme. However, in both protocols, the
shares of the certificate signing key is generated and distributed by a trusted
authority. Thus, they do not provide a fully distributed key management.
On the other hand, Deng et al. [6] proposed a secure key management
scheme for ad hoc networks which is fully distributed; meaning that no
trusted authority is assumed in either parts of the protocol. The combination
of IBC and (n, k)-threshold Secret Sharing forms the basis of their solution;
in which both the shares and the secret are generated collaboratively.
In this thesis, we propose two secure and efficient key establishment pro-
tocols by taking the work proposed by Deng et al. as basis. In other words,
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we customize their solutions at the sake of the requirements and constraints
of WMNs. In their scheme, due to the the idea of distributing the secret
among all the nodes, the shares are also generated by the collaboration of all
nodes. This makes their scheme inefficient with respect to the communica-
tion overhead introduced and network bandwidth used. We attenuate these
disadvantages by the advantageous characteristics of WMNs.
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3 Motivation and Contribution of the Thesis
This section includes information on why we selected this subject and what
contributions we made.
3.1 Motivation
Like all the other types of networks, Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) also
need a way of secure distribution of the private keys. In WMNs, the most
suitable cryptographic approach for the secure key establishment is the uti-
lization of Identity-based Cryptography (IBC). However, IBC assumes a
trusted third party (TTP) which does not fit the characteristics of WMNs.
Additionally, using a TTP in a security providing protocol is neither rational
nor practical due to the fact that such a system will be prone to single point
of failure. What we need is to distribute the role of the TTP assumed in
IBC.
As described in Section 2.3.1, in IBC, the role of the TTP is to generate
and distribute the private keys of the users. To perform that computation,
TTP holds a master secret key that belongs to the network. Therefore, in
order to distribute the role of it, the master secret key of the network must
be distributed.
The distribution of a secret can be done by the utilization of a Secret
Sharing scheme. In Additive Secret Sharing (AdSS) discussed in Section
2.3.2, the number of nodes collaboratively reconstruct the secret must be
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equal to the number of nodes in between which the secret is shared. Thus,
within a network with large number of nodes, using only AdSS is unreason-
able. What we left with is the Threshold Secret Sharing (ThSS), in which
the secret is shared in such a way that a defined number of users withhold-
ing a total of k shares can collaboratively reconstruct the it, as described
in Section 2.3.2. However, the most widely used ThSS, Shamir’s ThSS, also
assumes the existance of TTP. Therefore, the role of the TTP assumed in
Shamir’s ThSS should also be distributed and that can be done by using the
extended version of the Shamir’s ThSS scheme, which is described in Section
2.3.2.
3.2 Contribution of the Thesis
We examined the protocols proposed for the secure key establishment of
different types of wireless networks and tried to apprehend the most suitable
one for WMNs. Considering the constraints and the security requirements
of WMNs, we agreed on a key establishment scheme that combines Identity-
based Cryptography (IBC) and Threshold Secret Sharing (ThSS).
The proposed protocols using these techniques, discussed in Section 2.4,
have two important disadvantages:
1. Large transmission delays : the number of users that collaboratively
compute the master private key directly affects the amount of used
network bandwidth. If we assume that n users are in such collaboration,
then at least n × (n − 1) packets will be transmitted in between the
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nodes. This is due to the nature of the utilized secret sharing scheme,
which is described in Section 2.3.2.
2. The number of collaborative nodes dependent network resiliency : due
to the fact that any k nodes can collaboratively compute any other
node’s private key, the network is tolerant to k−1 compromised nodes,
where k is the threshold value. The resiliency of the network can only be
increased by increasing the value of k, which is infeasible because of the
fact that this value determines the required number of the neighboring
nodes.
The characteristics of WMNs provide us a way to centralize the network to
an extent. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, the mesh routers can be distin-
guished by the parameters they hold and/or by the operations they perform.
Thus, we imposed the burden of the master key generation on them. This
resulted in the reduction of the number of nodes present in the master key
generation operation, which clearly eliminated the first abovementioned dis-
advantage. Additionally, we assumed that it is hard to compromise the mesh
routers. With this assumption, we increased the number of shares needed in
the reconstruction process by increasing the number of shares that the mesh
routers hold. As a consequence, the resiliency of the system is increased
without increasing the number of required neighboring nodes.
At this point, it is important to mention the importance of not increasing
the neighboring node count. Since all the mesh nodes act as routers, the
throughput of a mesh node is mostly dependent on the network topology and
the number of neighbors of the node that are in its transmission range [25].
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It is shown that a node having six neighbors has the optimal transmission
power intensity in a stationary multi hop network [1].
In brief, we ameliorated the disadvantages mentioned above with the aid
of the characteristics of WMNs.
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4 Proposed Distributed Key Establishment (DKE)
This section provides a detailed explanation of our contributions. First, we
define our assumptions. Then we give the general methodology of our scheme.
Finally, we explain the specifications for two different proposed solutions.
4.1 Assumptions
Security solution does not rely on the existence of any trusted entity and there
is no pre-defined mutual trust among the mesh nodes. However, mesh nodes
will not collude to reveal any other mesh node’s private key, especially the
mesh routers.
By the characteristics of WMNs, we propose two secure and efficient key
establishment schemes that does not rely on any trust authority to gener-
ate and distribute the private keys of the nodes. In other words, there is
no underlying key establishment system. All the keys are generated collab-
oratively by the mesh routers and distributed accordingly to the mesh clients.
It is hard to compromise the mesh routers and they are arranged in a specific
way to cover the network area.
Mesh routers are the mesh nodes that form the backbone of the WMNs;
we know that they are there, for sure. We turned this characteristic into an
advantage by assuming that it is hard to compromise them. Additionally, we
deployed the mesh routers in such a way that they cover the network area in
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order to maintain continous connectivity. Obviously, mesh clients also have
a role in the coverage area.
Identities of the mesh nodes are unique and each node have a mechanism
to discover its one-hop neighbors.
As in all IBC systems, there is the assumption of the identity of the node
being unique. In order to easily overcome this uniqueness issue, the iden-
tities of the nodes are selected to be their addresses, which simply can be
obtained through dynamic address allocation. On the other hand, it can be
said that an adversary can simply decrease the bandwidth share by increasing
the number of hops in a route between the source and destination nodes that
a packet will traverse [2, 10]. In order to prevent this type of action, thus to
improve the capacity of the network, a node should only communicate with
nearby nodes as the analytical upper and lower bounds of a network capacity
implies [8]. Accordingly, we assume that each mesh node is able to discover
its neighbors and find out their identities.
4.2 General Methodology
Our proposed approach is composed of three phases: master private key
share generation, master private key share distribution and user private key
generation. First phase consists of collaborative generation of the master
private key shares performed by the mesh routers. In the second phase,
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generated master private key shares are distributed to the mesh clients. As
soon as a mesh client owns its master private key share, it can also contribute
to this distribution process. Last phase provides a private key generation
service, by which each mesh node6 can compute their user private keys. This
service is carried out by a collaboration of a defined number of mesh nodes.
Let us assume that we have a WMN of n = m+ l nodes, where m is the
number of mesh routers and l is the number of mesh clients. In the following
subsections, we give detailed information on how these phases are performed.
Table 1: The Symbols used in Protocol Definition
number of mesh nodes n
number of mesh routers m
number of mesh clients l
number of shares for mesh routers x
a mesh node MN
a mesh router MR
a mesh client MC
secret s
subshare of a secret ss
master public key MKpub
master private key MKpriv
master private key share MKSpriv
master public key share MKSpub
master private key partial share MKPS
user public key Q
user private key PK
6Both mesh routers and mesh clients
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4.2.1 Master Private Key Share Generation
The milestone of all the operations performed is the master private key
MKpriv, which will be shared among all the mesh nodes. As mentioned
above, generation of this key is carried out only by the mesh routers. Thus,
the total number of shares present in the system depends on the number of
shares that the mesh routers hold, namely x. This means that a total of
m× x shares will be distributed among the nodes of the network.
Just after the deployment of the mesh routers, the very first thing they
perform is the setup phase of the Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) system,
which is described in Section 2.3.1. The parameters of IBC are set and the
curve is constructed. Last two operations of IBC setup include the selection
of the master private key and the computation of the corresponding master
public key. As there is no trusted authority to construct and distribute the
keys to the mesh nodes, these operations are not performed as it is defined
in the original setup phase of IBC (Algorithm 7). Instead, the mesh routers
collaboratively generate the shares of the master private key.
Each mesh router MRi performs the following for the collaborative gen-
eration of the master private key shares:
1. computes subshares ssi, j, a, where j = 1, 2, . . . , m and a = 1, 2, . . . , x,
as described in Section 2.3.2.
2. sends ssi, j, a to MRj, where j = 1, 2, . . . , m, a = 1, 2, 3, . . . , x and
j 6= i .
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The corresponding algorithm for the generation of the subshares can be found
in Algorithm 2.
As a mesh router MRi receives its first subshare, it starts a timer, whose
reason is explained in Section 4.2.4. WhenMRi receives (m−1)×x subshares,
it cancels the timer and computes its master private key share via Equation
4.2. Additionally, withholding its master private key share, MRi computes
its master public key share via Equation 4.1 and publishes it. The operations
performed upon a receipt of a subshare can be found in Algorithm 3.
MKSprivi =
x∑
a=1
MKSprivi, a × li(0) (mod q) (4.1)
where, MKSprivi, a is defined as in Equation 4.2 and li(0) is the Lagrange
coefficient computed via the Equation 2.7.
MKSprivi, a =
m∑
j=1
ssj, i, a (mod q) (4.2)
.
MKSpubi =MKS
priv
i × P (4.3)
where, P is a common parameter used in IBC.
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Algorithm 2 MASTER-PRIVATE-KEY-SUBSHARE-ESTABLISHMENT
(s, m, x, k)
(1) a ← 0
(2) b ← 0
(3) index ← 0
(4) while a < x do
(5) while b < m do
(6) subsharesindex ← GENERATE − SECRET−
WITH − SHAMIR− ThSS(s, m, k)
(7) b ← b+ 1
(8) index ← index+ 1
(9) end while
(10) a ← a+ 1
(11) end while
(12) send the subshares to the corresponding nodes
In order for a mesh router to compute the actual value of the master
public key, it needs to hold sufficient number of these types of shares. With
that information, a mesh router reconstructs the master public key of the
network as described in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 in correspondence with the
definition of adequacy.
34
Algorithm 3 RECEIVE-MASTER-PRIVATE-KEY-SUBSHARE
(ssenderAddr,myID)
(1) if not received from senderAddr yet then
(2) if isF irstSubshareReceived6= true then
(3) isF irstSubshareReceived ← true
(4) subshareT imer.start() for some time interval
(5) end if
(6) subsharessenderAddr ← ssenderAddr,myID
(7) subshareCount ← subshareCount+ x
(8) if subshareCount = m× x− x and
masterPrivKeyShareSet = false then
(9) if subshareT imer is on then
(10) subshareT imer.cancel
(11) end if
(12) a ← 1
(13) while a < m do
(14) if a does not correspond to my identity then
(15) MKSpriv ← MKSpriv + subsharesa
(16) end if
(17) a ← a+ 1
(18) end while
(19) MKSpub ← MKSpriv × P
(20) broadcast MKSpub
(21) end if
(22) end if
4.2.2 Master Private Key Distribution
Second phase starts as a mesh client recognizes that one of its neighboring
nodes finished computing its master private key share. This recognition is
achieved with the message by which a mesh router publishes its master public
key share. Upon receiving such a message, mesh client MCi makes a request
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from whose reply it will learn which of its neighboring nodes will help for the
reconstruction of its master key shares7.
As a sufficient number of its neighboring nodes reply, the requesting mesh
client MCi generates another request message which contains a list of the
willing collaborators and broadcasts that message. Upon receiving the second
request message, mesh nodeMNj checks whether its identity is concatenated
in the collaborators list or not. If it is, thenMNj computes the master private
key partial share of MCi via Equation 4.4 and sends it to MCi.
MKPSj, i =MKS
priv
j × lj(i) (mod q) (4.4)
where, lj(i) is the Lagrange coefficient computed via the Equation 2.7.
On the other hand, if its identity does not appear in the collaborators
list, MNj simply discards the message.
When the requesting mesh client MCi receives all the information it asks
for, it computes its master private key share by simply adding up all the
received partial shares as in Equation 4.5.
MKSprivi =
k∑
j=1
MKPSj, i (mod q) (4.5)
Additionally, MCi reconstructs its master public key share as described in
Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
7Both the master private and the master public key shares.
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4.2.3 User Private Key Generation
After a mesh node finishes computing its master private key share, it can
make use of the private key generation service.
In order to reconstruct its user private key, mesh node MNi broadcasts a
request message. Upon receiving user private key generation request, mesh
node MNj computes the user private key share for MNi via Equation 4.6,
if it has already computed its master private key share. In order to do the
computation, MNj first retrieves the public key of MNi. However, if MNj
does not have its master private key share yet, it cashes the request to be
able to send a reply after it finishes its master private key share computation
(Algorithm 4).
PKSj, i =MKSi ×Qj (4.6)
where, Qj is the public key of the requesting node.
As the requesting node MNi receives sufficient number shares, it can
reconstruct its user private key as will be described in Sections 4.3.1 and
4.3.2 in correspondence with the definition of adequacy.
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Algorithm 4 SEND-PKG-REPLY (destAddr)
(1) if MKprivmyID is set then
(2) if MKPSprivdestAddr is not computed then
(3) MKPSprivdestAddr ←
EXTRACT − IBC(MKSpriv, destAddr)
(4) end if
(5) send MKPSprivdestAddr to MNdestAddr
(6) else
(7) cash destAddr as requester
(8) end if
4.2.4 Timeout Method
The most outstanding characteristic of the reconstruction operations is that
if a mesh node does not have sufficient number of neighboring nodes, it
simply can compute neither the master key shares nor the user private key.
However, a situation as the following may also occur: packet sent by a mesh
node consisting of a service request drops due to collisions. As a result, that
mesh node cannot compute either of the keys in spite of having sufficient
number of neighboring nodes.
In order to overcome such a problem, a timeout method (Algorithm 5) is
adopted. In this method, after sending a service request for either master key
share computation or user private key generation, a mesh node sets a timer
in correspondance with that request. If the mesh node makes this request on
a data which will be received for sure, i.e. master private subshare exchanged
in between the mesh routers, it keeps sending request packets periodically
until the desired data is received. On the other hand, if there is a doubt on
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the reception of the demanded data, i.e. user private key share, then the
mesh node repeats its request periodically only a number of times.
Algorithm 5 TIMEOUT
(1) if type = subshareT imer then
(2) if a MR then
(3) if enough subshares has not received then
(4) request subshare from which
has not received yet
(5) end if
(6) subshareT imer.start(3)
(7) else
(8) timerCount ← timerCount+ 1
(9) if timerCount < 10 then
(10) broadcast a request
(11) subshareT imer.start(3)
(12) end if
(13) end if
(14) else if type = pkgT imer then
(15) timerCount ← timerCount+ 1
(16) if timerCount < 10 then
(17) request private key generation
(18) pkgT imer.start(3)
(19) end if
(20) else if type = partialShareT imer then
(21) if enough shares has not received yet then
(22) request partial share from which
has not received yet
(23) end if
(24) partialShareT imer.start(3)
(25) end if
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4.3 Specialized Methodologies
In all of the (n, k)-Threshold Secret Sharing (ThSS) schemes, k is defined
as the sufficient number of shares needed for the reconstruction of the dis-
tributed secret. Thus, it is the numerical value of adequacy for the recon-
struction process of the ThSS. As discussed in Section 3.2, that value de-
termines the resiliency of the network, which should be increased without
increasing the value of the number of neighboring nodes.
We propose two different protocols that overcomes the problem, which
differ in the name of adequacy. In the first solution, k shares are enough
for a mesh node to reconstruct a desired value whilst in the second solution
the number of enough shares is k + 1. Actually, the main difference of those
proposed solutions is the use of the Secret Sharing method(s), which in turn
differs the solutions with respect both to the level of security they provide
and to the resiliency of the network.
In the following subsections, we describe how the master key shares are
distributed among the mesh nodes, and how the reconstruction is performed,
for both solutions.
4.3.1 DKE with use of ThSS
In this scheme, a (m× x, k)-ThSS is applied, where m× x is defined as the
total number of shares to be distributed among the mesh nodes.
Within the protocol, mesh nodes perform reconstruction while computing
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the master public key shares and their user private keys. All the other
computations/reconstructions are performed as described in Section 4.2.
In IBC, master public key is computed by the trusted authority via Equa-
tion 4.7.
MKpub =MKpriv × P (4.7)
Since we distributed the value MKpriv among the mesh nodes, each mesh
nodeMNi that has already computed its master private key share, computes
its master public key share, MKSpubi , by Equation 4.8.
MKSpubi =MKS
priv
i × P (4.8)
Thus, the actual value of the master public key can only be reconstructed by
a collaboration of k such shares via Equation 4.9.
MKpub =
k∑
i=1
MKSpubi × li(0) (4.9)
where, li(0) is the Lagrange coefficient.
As for the user private key reconstruction, it is defined in IBC as in
Equation 4.10.
PKi =MK
priv ×Qi (4.10)
where, Qi is the public key of a mesh node.
Because of the same abovementioned reasons, in our scheme, this com-
putation corresponds to that of given by Equation 4.11 performed by a col-
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laboration of k shareholders.
PKj =
k∑
i=1
PKSi, j × li(0) (4.11)
where, li(0) is the Lagrange coefficient and PKSi, j is the user private key
share of MNj computed by MNi.
When a mesh nodeMNi receives a reply for its user private key generation
request, it increments the number of shares it received according to the type
of the replying mesh node. When MNi receives sufficient number of shares
of its user private key, then it can perform the corresponding computation,
as given in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 RECEIVE-PKG-REPLY (PKsenderAddr,myID)
(1) if not received from senderAddr yet then
(2) PKsharessenderAddr ← PKsenderAddr,myID
(3) if MNsenderAddr is a MR then
(4) receivedPKGreplies ← receivedPKGreplies+ x
(5) else
(6) receivedPKGreplies ← receivedPKGreplies+ 1
(7) end if
(8) if sufficient receivedPKGreplies received then
(9) PK ← RECONCTRUCT − SECRET−
WITH − SHAMIR−
ThSS(PKshares, receivedPKreplies)
(10) end if
(11) end if
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4.3.2 DKE with use of both ThSS and AdSS
In this scheme, an Additive Secret Sharing (AdSS) is applied along with a
(m × x, k)-ThSS: the master private key of the network is defined as in
Equation 4.12.
MKpriv =MKpriv, 1 +MKpriv, 2 (4.12)
where, MKpriv, 1 is known by all the mesh routers while MKpriv, 2 is shared
among the mesh nodes in a (m× x, k)-ThSS fashion as described in Section
4.2.
As the sharing method implies, for any type of reconstruction, i.e. master
public key reconstruction and user private key reconstruction, a share from
a mesh router is now a must. The important point here is that each mesh
node needs to keep track of the identities of the mesh nodes from which they
receive a share.
As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, mesh nodes perform reconstruction while
computing either the master public key or their user private keys. For both
of the reconstruction operations, a mesh node MNi should have k shares
computed with MKpriv, 2 and a share computed with MKpriv, 1.
Upon the receipt of sufficient number of shares, the master public key is
reconstructed via Equation 4.13.
MKpub = (
k∑
i=1
MKSpubi × li(0) ) +MKSpubj (4.13)
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where, MKSpubi is computed by a mesh node MNi as given in Equation 4.14
and MKSpubj is computed by a mesh router MRj via Equation 4.15.
MKSpubi =MKS
priv, 2
i × P (4.14)
MKSpubj =MKS
priv, 1
j × P (4.15)
On the other hand, a mesh node MNi can reconstruct its user private
key as in Equation 4.16.
PKi = (
k∑
j=1
PKSj, i × lj(0) ) + PKSp, i (4.16)
where, PKSj, i is computed by a mesh node MNj via Equation 4.17 and
PKSp, j is computed by a mesh router MRp as in Equation 4.15.
PKSj, i =MKSi ×Qj (4.17)
PKSj, p =MKSp ×Qj (mod q) (4.18)
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5 Security and Resiliency Analysis
In this section, after analysing to what extent the security requirements of
the Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are met, we will analyse the resiliency
of the network.
5.1 Security Analysis
When the key establishment process finishes, each mesh node withholding its
user private key, the mesh nodes can utilize the network services. Since we
assumed that the identities of the mesh nodes uniquely identifies themselves,
denial of a mesh node of being what he claimed to be is impossible. The
confidentiality of the data transmitted along with authentication and non-
repudiation is achieved by encrypting the message both with the sending
node’s private key and the public key of the destined node. Moreover, with
the session key exchanged between the communicating nodes by the first
message transmitted, integrity is achieved.
Therefore, all of the security requirements listed in Section 2.1.2 are met
with the utilization of IBC, which is described in Section 2.3.1.
5.2 Resiliency Analysis
The resiliency of the network is the maximum number of compromised mesh
nodes by which the security of the network is not affected. If an adversary
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compromises a number of mesh nodes holding a total of k shares of the
master private key, he can compute all the user private keys. Therefore, the
resiliency of the network can be increased by increasing the threshold value.
In the following subsections, we analyse both DKE with ThSS and DKE
with ThSS and AdSS with respect to the resiliency of the network.
5.2.1 Resiliency Analysis of DKE with ThSS
In this scheme, each mesh router has x shares while each mesh client has 1
share of the master private key and we are using a (m× x, k)-ThSS scheme,
wherem is the number of mesh routers. An adversary must capture a number
of nodes wihholding a total of at least k shares of the master private key in
order to reconstruct the master private key of the network. As a consequence,
the resiliency of the network is conserved even if an adversary compromises
q mesh routers and p mesh clients satisfying Equation 5.1.
k < (q × x) + p (5.1)
For instance, in a network with 3 mesh routers and 4 mesh clients, where
the master private key is distributed in a (6, 4)-ThSS fashion, each mesh
router has 2 shares. In such a network, an adversary can compute all the
user private keys if he compromises either 1 mesh router and 2 mesh clients
or 2 mesh routers or 4 mesh clients. Thus, this network is resilient to either
q = 1 or p = 3, where q is the number of captured mesh routers and p is the
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number of captured mesh clients. When we increase the threshold value to
6, an adversary prospers if he compromises either 3 mesh routers or 2 mesh
routers and 2 mesh clients or 1 mesh router and 4 mesh clients. Thus, the
resiliency of the network is satisfied when either 2 mesh routers or 4 mesh
clients are compromised.
5.2.2 Resiliency Analysis of DKE with ThSS and AdSS
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, this scheme ensures that a mesh router will
always contribute to any of the reconstruction processes. Therefore, in order
for an adversary to be successful, he needs to capture a mesh router. In other
words, as long as a mesh router is not compromised, no matter how many
mesh clients are captured, the resiliency of the network is conserved. On the
other hand, if a mesh router is compromised, then the network is resilient to
the number of captured mesh routers and mesh clients, as decribed in the
previous subsection.
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6 Communication and Computational Overheads
Let us assume a WMN with n = m + l nodes, where m is the number
of mesh routers and l is the number of mesh clients. Additionally, let us
assume that each mesh router holds x shares. Retaining those, we examine
the communication and computational overheads introduced by our proposed
solutions in the following subsections.
6.1 Communication Overhead
The communication overhead is introduced by the master key generation and
distribution along with the user private key generation operations.
Since we disarranged the roles of the trusted third parties (TTPs) defined
in IBC and Shamir’s ThSS schemes, explained in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2,
the master key of the network is generated collaboratively. As described in
Section 4.2, mesh routers are the ones to construct the master private key
shares and distribute them to the mesh clients.
The generation of the master private key shares requires at least8 m ×
(m − 1) packets to be sent of each is a unicast message. For the other
operations performed following this phase, there are a number of things that
affect the number of packets sent: number of mesh clients realizing the first
fraction of the operations is finished, number of mesh nodes that can respond
to a request, number of mesh nodes that computed their master private key
8If a drop occurs, the packets are retransmitted.
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shares, etc. Nevermore, none of the operations, i.e. master public and user
private key generations, master private key share distribution, introduce a
larger number of packet transmissions. In other words, the number of packets
transmitted after master private key share generation is considerably small.
As a consequence, the communicational complexity of the proposed solutions
is O(m2) in terms of the number of packets transmitted.
6.2 Computational Overhead
The computational overhead is introduced by the use of Identity-based Cryp-
tography (IBC) along with both Threshold Secret Sharing (ThSS) and Ad-
ditive Secret Sharing (AdSS), described in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.2.
First of all, each mesh router distributes its randomly selected secret,
which contains m × (k − 1) modular exponentiation and (m + 1) × (k − 1)
modular addition operations. As the receipt of m− x subshares, each mesh
router performs a modular addition of m × x values. After a mesh router
computes its master private key share, it computes the master public key
share of its own, which consists of an ECC multiplication. Then, for the
computation of the partial shares that will be sent to the corresponding
mesh clients, k modular multiplications and k modular additions are per-
formed. Finally, each mesh client reconstructs its master private key share,
the master public key and their user private keys seperately by 3k × (k − 1)
modular multiplications along with k × (k − 1) modular inverse operation,
k ECC multiplications and k ECC additions. For those reconstructions to
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be carried out, each mesh node that responds to a request performs 1 ECC
multiplication for the computation of the requested share. As for the master
public key and the user private key computation of the mesh routers, the
same operations are used. The total computational overhead can be found
in Table 2 with respect to the type of operations performed.
Table 2: Computational Overheads for DKE with ThSS
Modular Exponentiation m2 × (k − 1)
Modular Addition m× ((m+ 1)× (k − 1) + (m× x+ k))
Modular Multiplication m× (k + 6k × (k − 1) + 3k × l × (k − 1))
Modular Inverse 2m× k × (k − 1) + l × k × (k − 1)
ECC Addition (2m× k) + k × l
ECC Multiplication m× (m+ 2k) + (k × l)
As for the second proposed solution, DKM with ThSS and AdSS, we
have the computational overhead introduced by AdSS along with the above-
mentioned ones. In this solution, AdSS is used only in the reconstruction
operations and involves an ECC addition. Since we have 2 reconstruction
operations for each mesh node, i.e. master public key and user private key
reconstructions, and an additional reconstruction operation for each mesh
client, i.e. master private key share reconstruction, a total of 2m + 3l ECC
additions is performed. Neverthless, for each of these reconstruction requests,
an additional share is computed by an ECC multiplication.
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7 Performance Evalution
We used Network Simulator 2 (ns2) [17], which is an open source discrete
event network simulator, to evaluate the performance of the solutions that
we propose. In the following subsections, we present our simulation setup,
we introduce the implemetation details and finally, we discuss the simulation
results.
7.1 Simulation Setup
Since we propose two different solutions for secure key generation and dis-
tibution in WMNs, we simulated two different scenarios. For each scenario,
we modeled the network as having n = 30, 40, 50, . . . , 100 nodes within an
area of 2000 × 2000 square meter. Since the make the assumption that the
mesh routers cover the network area, we have 25 mesh routers in each model
and each has 2 shares of the master private key. In the simplest form, the
mesh routers dwell on the coordinates as to cover the network area. Each
mesh router is in the transmission range of its neighboring mesh routers. On
the other hand, mesh clients are disposed within the area randomly. Addi-
tionally, we simulated the behavior of the network for the threshold values
k = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12.
All the simulations are run on a personal computer with the following
configuration:
• Windows Vista (32-bit)
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• Intel Core 2 Duo T5450 Processor at 1.66 GHz
• 2 GB RAM
• GCC 4.3.3 on Cygwin 1.5.25-15
• ns2 version 2.33
7.2 State of the Network
State of the network consists of the placement of the nodes and the options
defined for them. Since the comparison of two different protocols is consid-
ered, the mesh nodes are placed at the same coordinates on each protocol.
However, the coordinates of the mesh clients are selected randomly within
the specified area.
As for the options of the nodes, there are several of them described below:
7.2.1 Channel, MAC and Network Interface Types
As the medium implies the channel type is wireless channel and thus the
MAC type is 802.11. However, it is important to mention that the MAC
type that we used is implemented by the company named Mercedes [20].
This is because of the fact that it is more stable than the one that is defined
inside the ns2. Secondly, the network interface type used is the wireless
physical layer and the version that Mercedes implemented is used due to the
same stability concerns.
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7.2.2 Antenna and Radio Propogation Models
Omni-directional antenna with a transmission range of 375 meters is used
as for the antenna model. The reason we selected this type is that it is
both easy and inexpensive to set and use them. As for the radio-propagation
model, it is defined as two ray ground, which considers both the direct path
and a ground reflection path; giving an accurate prediction at long distances
[21, 17].
7.2.3 Queue Type
The interface queue type is selected as the priority queue defined under drop
tail queue. It implements FIFO scheduling and drop-on-overflow buffer man-
agement among the classes of the same priority level [17]. Upon a receipt
of a message, a node checks if the block flag, which contains information on
whether a packet is already in process or not, is set. If the flag is not set, the
mesh node sets the block flag and processes the packet. Otherwise, the mesh
node puts the packet into the queue for later processing. After a packet is
processed, the block flag is released with a callback function.
At this point, it is important to mention that using a queue that im-
plements single forwarding affects the fairness of the system. For instance,
even in a network with three nodes, when two of the nodes want to send a
packet to the third node at the same instant of time, one of the packets came
across with starvation. As a result, the throughput of a node decreases as
the number of nodes increases [10].
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7.2.4 Routing Protocol
There are three types of routing protocols that are proposed by ad hoc net-
works, thus applicable to WMNs: proactive, reactive and hybrid [4]. The
proactive routing protocols act just as the same as the routing protocols that
are designed for wired networks; at least one route is retained to any desti-
nation. In opposition to those, in the reactive routing protocols a route is
found if and only if a source node has data to send to a destination node
that it has not have a route to send the data yet. As for the hybrid routing
protocols, as its name implies, it is the combination of proactive and reactive
routing protocols.
Since WMNs are not stable, i.e. new nodes may join and/or existing nodes
may leave the network, the proactive routing protocols cannot be used. The
selected routing protocol should be able to construct a new route when an
existing node is failed to operate or decided to leave the network. Accordingly,
it should be able to construct a new route for newly joining mesh nodes.
In other words, it must be flexible in sense of changing topology. On the
other hand, the protocols that have a high overhead and that require global
information are not applicable to WMNs due to their constraints.
Considering those facts, we selected Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) as
the routing protocol for our simulations.
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7.2.5 Transport Layer Communication Protocol
We simulated our models with UDP during the first runs. Since the master
private key share generation process needs the guarantee of all the packets
to be delivered athough UDP does not, simulation results did not seemed
satisfactory. Most of the mesh nodes were not even able to compute their
master private key shares. Thus, we turned out attention on TCP.
The reason of this choice actually stems from the fact that TCP uses flow
control. To be more clear, with the utilization of TCP, data is guaranteed to
be delivered. On the contrary, since it is designed initially for wired networks,
it mostly captures the packet losses that occur because of the buffer overflows.
However, in WMNs the losses may occur not only by the buffer overflows
but also due to collisions, mobility and the utilization of wireless links [11].
Therefore, TCP shows a lower performance than in wired networks. This
is actually the reason that we introduced the timeout method mentioned in
Section 4.
7.3 Implementation Details
7.3.1 Cryptographic Operation Latencies
Due to the fact that the computational latencies are not taken into account
by ns2, they are computed separately and inserted into the protocol either
just after a message is received or just before a message is sent. Those
latencies include the time consumed in the Identity-base Cryptography (IBC)
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setup, (n, k)-Threshold Secret Sharing (ThSS) setup, master private key
share (MKSprivi ) computation performed by mesh routers, master public key
share (MKSpubi ) and user private key share (PKi, j) computations performed
by the mesh nodes ; all of which remain same as the threshold value k changes
and are given in Table 3.
Table 3: Static Latency Benchmark
Setup of IBC 0, 00013 ms
Setup of (n, k)-ThSS 0, 070526 ms
Computation of MKSprivi 0, 001712 ms
Computation of MKSpubi 0, 00903 ms
Computation of PKi, j 0, 00937 ms
Additionally, there are the latencies that are changing with respect to the
threshold value k. Those latencies consist of the computation of the master
private key partial share (MKSprivi, j ) along with the reconstructions ofMKpub
and MSK. The values of the dynamic latencies can be found in Table 4.
Table 4: Dynamic Latency Benchmark for the Second Protocol
k computation of MKSprivi, j reconstructions of MKpub and MSK
4 0, 0002 ms 0, 05106 ms
6 0, 0003 ms 0, 1011 ms
8 0, 0004 ms 0, 1679 ms
10 0, 0006 ms 0, 19178 ms
12 0, 0007 ms 0, 21726 ms
We did not implemented IBC but we used the implemented one present
in Multiprecision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C/C++ Library (Miracl)
[15]. In this implementation, the cryptographic parameter q is defined as in
Equation 7.1.
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q = 2159 + 217 + 1 (7.1)
The other parameters are set as given in Algorithm 7 and has the following
properties:
• q / p+ 1
• p%3 = 2
• p%8 = 3
• y2 = x3 + 1 (mod p)
7.3.2 Performance Metrics
We consider two metrics for each model: elapsed time and success percentage.
Latency of Key Establishment is defined as the time difference between
the deployment of the mesh nodes and the end of the processes of each node.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, a mesh node can either compute its user private
key or not, and that depends on the number of neighboring nodes that the
mesh node has. Since we introduced a timeout period for the mesh nodes
to understand whether they can compute its user private key or not; at the
end, a mesh node or a mesh router either has its user private key or it quits
trying to compute one. When the last node finishes its process, the latency
of key establishment is realized.
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Success Percentage for Private Key Generation is the ratio of the
number of mesh nodes that can compute their user private keys to the total
number of the mesh nodes present within the network. In other words, it is
the percentage of the mesh nodes that can compute their user private keys.
7.4 Results
Figures 5 and 6 show the difference in the success ratio for the private key
generation with respect to the changes in both n and k, where n is the total
number of mesh nodes and k is the threshold value. As mentioned in Section
4.2.4, the private key generation service is carried out succesfully if and only
if the requesting mesh node receives a total of k shares from its neighboring
nodes, who finished computing their master private key shares. Thus, the
success percentage not only depends on the number of shares received but
also to the number of neighboring nodes that actually have their master
private key shares. When the threshold value is 4, all the nodes compute
their user private keys while when it is 6, at least 90% of them can do the
computation. As we increase the value of k, the success ratio decreases;
meaning that the nodes cannot compute their user private keys due to the
absence in the received shares. On the other hand, as we increase the total
number of mesh nodes, for the same value of k, we achieve a higher success
ratio. This is because of the fact that the number of neighboring nodes
increase as the network size increases. In other words, more shares become
accessible by the requesting node.
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If we were to compare those two different patterns, a decrease in the
success percentage in Figure 6 with respect to Figure 5 is clearly seen. The
reason being is that in the protocol that corresponds to Figure 6, receiving
a share from a mesh router is a must. Thus, if a mesh node cannot receive a
share from a mesh router, for any reason9, even if it receives k shares from
other mesh nodes, it cannot reconstruct its user private key. Essentially, this
is one of the tradeoffs between the two proposed protocols: as the security
level increases, the success percentage decrease.
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Figure 5: Success Percentage of DKE with ThSS
9With the increase in the network size, the number of packets transmitted increases;
yielding more packets to collide and/or drop.
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Figure 6: Success Percentage of DKE with ThSS and AdSS
In the Figures 7 and 8 the time diversification is examined with respect
to the changes in n and k. Since the most of the burden is on the first phase,
i.e. mesh routers generate the master private key shares, the latency of key
establishment does not affected by the total number of mesh nodes. Also, the
threshold values smaller than 6 do not affect the latency. This is due to the
fact that almost all the mesh nodes can compute their private keys for those
values of k. However, as we increase k, the decrease in the success percentage
results in an increase in the latency. This is due to the fact that some of the
nodes cannot compute their private keys and they use the timeout method
proposed, described in Section 4.2.4.
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Figure 7: Latency of DKE with ThSS
Also we adopt the proposed schemes to an ad hoc network, as it is done
in [6]. The main difference between an ad hoc network and a WMN is their
infrastructures. In ad hoc networks, connectivity depends on the movements
of the end users because of the fact that they do not possess dedicated nodes
as mesh routers. Therefore, the network becomes less resilient in comparison
to WMNs. Essentially, an ad hoc network can be considered as a subset of
WMNs. In the knowledge of that information, in an ad hoc network, the
master private key share generation is performed with the collaboration of
all the nodes present in the network. As expected, this increases the number
of packets transmitted, which yields to a larger number of collisions and thus
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Figure 8: Latency of DKE with ThSS and AdSS
larger number of drops.
The success percentage for private key generation and the latency of key
establishment show a pattern as in Figures 9 and 10. The timeout method
used for the drops becomes unsatisfactory in this scheme. This results in a
network that is inadequate for the values n > 60 no matter the value of k is,
and for the values k > 8 no matter the network size is. Besides, because of
the drops, some of the mesh nodes cannot even compute their master private
key shares. Thus, the number of neighboring nodes of a requesting node that
has computed its master private key share lessens. This is why a sharp drop
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is seen as the threshold value increases. As for the latency, all the values
seem to be as expected. An increase in the value of k increases the latency,
just like the effect of the increase in the total number of nodes.
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Figure 9: Success Percentage for an Ad hoc Network
As we compare these results with that of ours, we can easily realize that
the success percentages for private key generation are higher in our schemes.
This is due to the abovementioned disadvantage, i.e. increased number of
drops, which unfortunately stems from the infrastructural characteristics of
the ad hoc networks. Moreover, the latency of key establishment is higher
in the ad hoc version even the number of successful private key generation
operations is lesser. This actually is related to the timeout method used.
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Figure 10: Latency for an Ad hoc Network
To be more clear, since the number of nodes that are capable of performing
the generation and/or reconstruction operations is reduced, the time passes
during the retrial increases.
Consequently, for the success percentage, our scheme shows a better per-
formance up to %32 for n = 40 and up to %37 for n = 60. As for the latency,
considering the worst case values, our scheme accomplishes the operations
almost %23 faster.
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8 Conclusions and Future Work
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are an emerging research area representing
a good solution for providing low-cost and high-speed network services for
the end users. However, the achievement of the security requirements is not
trivial due to the constraints they have. On the contrary, key establishment
is the most important and critical security concern that any type of wireless
network need to have.
In this thesis, we propose two efficient and secure key establishment pro-
tocols designed with respect to the advantages and disadvantages of WMNs.
On the basis, they make use of Identity-based Cryptography (IBC), which
eliminates the necessity of the certificate based public key distribution indis-
pensible in the conventional PKI-based schemes. The problems arise from
the assumptions of IBC are eliminated by the use of a (n, k)-Threshold Se-
cret Sharing scheme; trusted authority is abrogated with the collaborative
generation of the secrets. Additionally, with the utilization of a variant of
Shamir’s Threshold Secret Sharing scheme, resiliency of the network is in-
creased. Most importantly, a more secure solution appeared by the adoption
of the Additive Secret Sharing.
Our simulations show that 100% of the mesh nodes can compute their
private keys within at most 60 seconds, regardless of the value of the number
of mesh nodes for the threshold value 4. For the worst case, i.e. a network
with 40 nodes performing at the threshold level 12, at least 58% of the mesh
nodes can compute their private keys within 90 seconds on the average. As we
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increase the threshold value, the success percentage decreases, as expected.
However, with such increase the effect of the number of nodes appears: the
larger the number of nodes, the larger the success percentage.
However, as in all the systems, not always everything shapes up; there
always seems to be a tradeoff in between the requirements. The simulation
results implied a drawback for DKE with ThSS and AdSS: with the increase
in the security level, the latency of key establishment is increased and the
success percentage for the private key generation is decreased as compared
to DKE with ThSS. Nevertheless, the difference between these two schemes
are not too much, which makes DKE with ThSS and AdSS still useful for
more security-demanding applications.
Above all, there are still some details remained intact and needs to be
considered. First of all, during the process of collaboratively computing
the share of the master private key, the messages are transmitted in plain;
i.e. unecrypted. An authentication mechanism for the mesh nodes should
be provided. Secondly, since it is assumed that there is no mutual trust
in between the mesh nodes, the subshares generated and distributed by a
mesh node should be verifiable by the receiving node. This can be achieved
by adopting one of the verifiable secret sharing scheme proposed [18, 19].
Finally, as mention in Section 7.3.1, the benchmarks are taken from the runs
used by the implemented IBC that is embedded in Miracl. However, those
cryptographic parametes do not fit with that of ThSS’s. Thus, a compatible
implementation of IBC can be carried out.
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APPENDIX - Algorithms used in the cryptographic approaches
Algorithm 7 is the setup phase and Algorithm 8 is the extract phase of
the Identity-based Cryptography (IBC). Algorithms 9 and 10 are used in the
extact phase of IBC. On the other hand, Algorithms 11 and 12 define how
the secret is generated, distributed and reconstructed in an (n, k)-Threshold
Secret Sharing (ThSS) scheme.
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Algorithm 7 SETUP-IBC (q)
(1) t ← 2511/2q
(2) s ← (2511 − 1)/2q
(3) while true
(4) n ← random integer
(5) n ← n mod t
(6) p ← 2(n× q)− 1
(7) if p is a prime then
(8) break
(9) end if
(10) end while
(11) coef ← 2n
(12) EC ← elliptic curve
(13) while true
(14) temp ← random point
(15) cube ← temp p+13
(16) cube ← cubep−1
(17) if cube is unity then
(18) break
(19) end if
(20) end while
(21) while true
(22) P ← random point
(23) P ← P × coef
(24) if P 6= 0 then
(25) break
(26) end if
(27) end while
(28) s ← random integer
(29) Ppub ← s× P
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Algorithm 8 EXTRACT-IBC (s, id)
(1) Qid ← MAP − TO − POINT (id)
(2) Did ← s×Qid
(3) privKey ← GET −X(Did)
(4) return privKey
Algorithm 9 GET-X (y, p)
(1) t ← ((y + 1)× (y − 1))% p
(2) return (t
(2p−1)
3 )% p
Algorithm 10 MAP-TO-POINT (id)
(1) y ← H1(id)
(2) x ← GET −X(y)
(3) Q ← set point with x and y
(4) return Q
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Algorithm 11 SHARE-SECRET-WITH-SHAMIR-ThSS (s, n, k)
(1) coefficients : integer array of size k − 1
(2) sharedDataTmp : integer array of size n
(3) i ← 0
(4) while i < k − 1 do
(5) coefficientsi ← random integer
(6) coefficientsi ← coefficientsi mod q
(7) i ← i+ 1
(8) end while
(9) i ← 0
(10) while i < n do
(11) sharedDataTmpi ← 0
(12) j ← 0
(13) while j < k − 1 do
(14) coeffTmp ← ((i+ 1)j+1) mod q
(15) sharedDataTmpi ←(sharedDataTmpi
+(coefficientsj × coeffTmp)) mod q
(16) j ← j + 1
(17) end while
(18) i ← i+ 1
(17) end while
(18) sharedData ← template array of size n
(19) i ← 0
(20) while i < n do
(21) sharedDataTmpi ← (sharedDataTmpi + s) mod q
(22) sharedDatai.data ← sharedDataTmpi
(23) sharedDatai.id ← i+ 1
(24) i ← i+ 1
(25) end while
(26) return sharedData
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Algorithm 12 RECONSTRUCT-SECRET-WITH-SHAMIR-ThSS
(sharedData, m)
(1) nominators : integer array of size m
(2) denominators : integer array of size m
(3) i ← 0
(4) while i < m do
(5) nominatorsi ← 1
(6) denominatorsi ← 1
(7) j ← 0
(8) while j < i do
(9) if i 6= j then
(10) nominatorsi ← nominatorsi
×sharedDataj.id
(11) denominatorsi ← denominatorsi
×(sharedDataj.id− sharedDatai.id)
(12) nominatorsi ← (nominatorsi×
denominators−1i ) mod q
(13) end if
(14) j ← j + 1
(15) end while
(16) i ← i+ 1
(17) end while
(18) i ← 0
(19) while i < m do
(20) nominatorsi ← (nominatorsi×
sharedDataj.data) mod q
(21) i ← i+ 1
(22) end while
(23) reconstructedData ← 0
(24) i ← 0
(25) while i < m do
(26) reconstructedData ← (reconstructedData
+nominatorsi) mod q
(27) i ← i+ 1
(28) end while
(29) return reconstructedData
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